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BINING SLIP.-Two cases, arising out of the same transaction, recently decided in the Court of Appeals of New York (Lipman v. Viagara
Fire Ins. Co., I89o, 121 N. Y. 454, and K7arelsen v. Sun Fire Office, i89o,
122 N. Y. 545), deal with the proper construction and effect of what are
known in insurance circles as "binding slips," and are the latest and
best considered decisions in reference to these peculiar contracts. The
plaintiffs, who were partners, had instructed certain insurance brokers to
procure insurance on their property, and the brokers took to the defendants a "binding slip," which was accepted. by them. This "binding
slip " was as follows:
PELL,

VALL.AcK

& CO., Insurances,

No. 55 Liberty Street, New York, Sept. 2, 1885.
The undersigned do insure for account of Shaped Seamless Stocking
Company, amounts as specified below at Iy+ for twelve months from September 2, 18S5, on machinery and stock, building No. 3 (as per form,
building situate Randall's Island, N. Y.). This receipt binding until
policy is delivered at the office of Pell, Wallack & Co.
Amount.
Comlpany.
.. .$2,500
....................
Niagara .......
...
2,500
...................
Sun, England .....
Accepted by PoLLocK.
No premium was paid at the time. Upon receiving the binding slip
the brokers immediately sent it to the plaintiff, in whose possession it remained until the day of the fire, which took place September 5, at 3 P. MI.
At 12.30 P. MI. of that day, the Niagara Co. sent a notice to the brokers
iagaraFire
that they did not want to write the risk. In Lipman v.
Ins. Co. (I8SS), 48 Hun. 503, the Supreme Court held, as the defendant
company contended, that the binding slip entitled the plaintiffs to the
issue of such a policy as was then ordinarily used by the defendant, although it contained unusual terms and conditions. The policies in use at
that time by the Niagara Fire Insurance Company, contained these provisions, which the plaintiffs claimed were unusual in fire insurance
policies, and therefore not to be read into the binding slip, since that on
its face did not purport to be subject to them, viz:
5. Relative to Issue and Cancellation of Policy.
i. If any broker or other person than the assured have procured this
policy, or any renewal thereof, or any indorsement thereon, he shall be
deemed to be the agent of the assured, and not of this company, in any
transaction relating to the insurance.
2. This insurance may be terminated at any time by request of the assured, or by the company, on giving notice to that effect to the assured,
or to the person who may have procured this insurance to be taken by
this company. On surrender of the policy the company shall refund any
premium that may have been paid, reserving the usual short rates in the
first case and pro ratarates in the second case.
The Supreme Court held, accordingly, that notice to the brokers was
sufficient to cancel the binding slip; but held that such notice must be
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given within a reasonable time before the fire, so as to give the assured an
opportunity to procure other insurance, and that the interval in this case,
of two hours and a half, was not such reasonable time. The Court of Appeals, in Lipman v. NiagaraF. I. Co. (i89o), 121 N. Y. 454, affirmed the
ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to the binding slip, stating that
document to be " not a mere agreement to insure, but a present insurance to the amount specified therein," and interpreting it as follows:
"The binding slip was a short method of issuing a temporary policy for
the convenience of all parties, to continue until the execution of the
formal one. It would be unreasonable to suppose either that the brokers
expected an insurance except upon the usual terms imposed by the company, or that the company intended to insure upon any other terms. The
right of an insurance company to terminate a risk is an important one.
It is not reserved in terms in the binding slip and could not be exercised
at all so long as no policy should be issued, unless the condition in the
policy is deemed to be incorporated therein. Upon the plaintiff's contention, the company could not cancel the risk so long as the binding
slip was in force, and the only remedy of the company to get rid of the
risk would be to issue the policy and then immediately cancel it. The
binding slip was a mere memorandum to identify the parties to the contract, the subject matter and the principal terms. It refers to the policy
to be issued. The construction is, we think, the same as though it had
expressed that the present insurance was under the terms of the usual
policy of the company to be thereafter delivered."
The ruling of the Supreme Court in regard to the notice given, however,
was reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that as no premium had been
paid, and the binding slip was subject to all the terms and conditions of
the usual policy of the company, the cancellation was effected eo instante,
at the time of the service of the notLce on the brokers, according to the
simple terms of the contract.
In Karelsen v. Sun Fire Office (i890), 122 N. Y. 545, there was a dispute of fact as to whether the notice hadbeen givenbefore or after the fire.
But the Ccurt reasserted the doctrine of Lipman v. NiagaraFireIns. Co.,
in regard to the interpretation of the binding slip, as follows: " While
the binding slip contained none of the conditions usually fouad in insurance policies, the contract evidenced by it was the ordinary policy of insurance issued by the company. So that, in any construction of the contract, it must be regarded as ' though it had expressed that the present
insurance was under the terms of the usual policy of the company to be
thereafter delivered': 'Lipman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 121 N. Y.
454."
From these cases, then, it may be concluded that: i. A binding slip is
not a mere agreement to insure, but a present, though temporary, insurance, intended to be binding until the issue of a regular policy. 2. It is
not, however, itself the contract of insurance, but only a memorandum
thereof, the real contract being the policy to be thereafter issued. 3. The
binding slip, therefore, is to be interpreted as if it were one of the policies
in general use by the company at the time, and is subject to all the terms
and conditions which those policies contain. 4. In the caselast cited, the
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Court say: "The Iermann Case (ioo N. Y. 411) is not applicable, for in
that case the policy had been delivered to the assured and the authority of
the brokers was at an end. While here the brokers had not, as yet, obtained the policies, and in the Slone Case had not made delivery to the
assured. Consequently, their right as well as duty to represent the
plaintiffs in all matters necessary to accomplish that which they had undertaken, remained." This language would seem to imply that the Court
considered that the contract of insurance is not a finality, and that the
authority of the brokers does not terminate, in cases where a binding slip
has been delivered, until the delivery of the regular policy ; a state of
affairs which would seem to be directly contradictory to what was held
in the same case and in the Lipman Case, that the binding slip was
simply an evidence of the contract contained in the policy. In that view
of the case, the contract made by the binding slip and policy is single, instead of being an agreement to insure, equivalent to an inchoate contract
of insurance, followed by the completed contract in the policy, and the
contract is at an end when the binding slip is delivered, the only remaining duty of the brokers being to receive the policy when made out and
transmit it to the assured; and this, presumably, only when the binding
slip, as in the present case, expressly so provides. Unless then, either
the binding slip or the policy contain a provision to such effect, it would
seem, in spite of the language quoted above, that after a binding slip is
made out and delivered, the authority of the brokers is at an end, and that
therefore notice of cancellation given to them is insufficient. In other
words, unless the binding slip or policy contain an express provision that
notice of cancellation may be given to the brokers who procure the insurance, such notice must be given to the assured in order to effect the
R. D. S.
cancellation.
LEGAL HOLMAvS.-In addition to the statutes of Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana and Utah (ante, pages 233-5), the following have
been passed since the publication of the leading article on this subject
in the A-IERICANT LAw REGISTER for i8go:

MICHIGAN. (See 29 A-ERICAx LAiw REGISTER, 169.)
Section 2274 of the Compiled Statutes has been repealed and re-enacted
in somewhat enlarged language, by"AN ACT to provide for the taxation and regulation of the business of
manufacturing, selling, keeping for sale, furnishing, giving, or delivering spirituous and intoxicating liquors, and malt, brewed or fermented
liquors and vinous liquors in this State, and to repeal all acts or parts
of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act." Approved, June
28, ISS7 ; LaN'vs, 445, 455 ; 3 Howell's Gen. Stat,, ed. i89o, pp. 3191-2.
" SEC. 17. All saloons, restaurants, bars, in taverns or elsewhere, and all
other places, except drug stores, where any of the liquors mentioned in
this act are sold, or kept for sale, either at wholesale or retail, shall be
closed onl the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, on all election days, on all legal holidays, and until seven o'clock in the following
morning, and on each week day night from and after the hour of nine
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o'clock until seven o'clock of the morning of the succeeding day. And it
shall be the duty of sheriffs, marshals, constables and police officers to
close all saloons, houses or places that shall be found open in violation of
the provisions of this section, and to report forthwith all such violators to
the prosecuting attorney, whose duty it shall be to immediately prosecute
for such violations. The word 'closed' in this section shall be construed
to apply to the back door or other entrance as well as to the front door.
And in prosecutions under this section it shall not be necessary to prove
that any liquor was sold: Provided, That in all cities and incorporated
villages the common council or board of trustees, or council, may, by ordinance, allow the saloons and other places where said liquor shall be sold
to open at six o'clock in the forenoon and to remain open not later than
eleven o'clock in theafternoon and no longer of any week day night, except on election days and holidays. Any person found in the act of violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
breach of the peace and punished accordingly ; and the arrest therefor
may be without process, and this punishment shall be taken to be in excess of all other manner of punishment in this act provided for a violation
of the provisions of this section. All officers authorized to make arrests
for a breach of the peace shall have like power to make arrests under the
provisions of this section as in other cases of a breach of the peace."
"SEc. I8.Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the
five preceding sections shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section seven of this
act."
The Michigan case of Hamilon v. The People, cited 29 AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER 143-4, is also reported in full in 13 Id. 679-691.
NEW YORK. (See 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 174.)
In addition to the cases already cited (29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
145), the more recent one of Didsbury v. Van Tassell, Sheriff (i89o), 56
Hun. 423, has upheld the service of a summons (in an action against a
sheriff for an escape) though made upon Christmas Day. In the course
of the opinion of the Supreme Court, DYKMAN, J., said: "It is to be
observed, generally, that no law in this State has ever interdicted the
service of any legal process, or the holding of any court on a holiday.
Such days have heretofore been designated for certain specified purposes
connected with commercial paper, and in no statute creating them, have
legal proceedings ever received mention. No court can be opened for
the transaction of business on the day of any general or special election,
or on Sunday, with somd exceptions, unimportant here [see 29 AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER 145, 176], and that is the extent of such inhibition in
this State. * * It would have been easy to prohibit the commencement of actions and the transaction of legal business upon holidays, and
make them Sundays for all purposes, but it was not done, and the issuance and service of legal process remains unrestricted, as it was anterior
to this law, and holidays are yet juridical. Our examination has failed
to discover any case where judicial proceedings have been set aside, or
nullified, because they were instituted, continued or terminated, on a
legal holiday" : Id. 424, 426.
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Similarly, the decision in The Peoble v. Kearney (I88S), 47 Hun. (N.
Y.) 129 (see 29 AMERICAN LAW R,.EGISTER 144), has been followed in the
civil case in the same Court, of The People ex rel. v. Boardof Supervisors
(I888), 4 N. Y. Supp. 751, where an alternative writ of mandamius had
been served on Saturday afternoon. The Supreme Court refused to set
aside this service, M1ARTrN, J., saying that: "Surely the service of papers
in this case, cannot be regarded as the transaction of business in a public
office of the State, or in a public office of the County." For additional
authority, the Court cited two decisions of the New York City Court,
Friesv. Coar (1887), 13 N. Y. Civil Proc. Rep. 152, and Nicholsv. Kelsey:
Id. 154. The former decided that the following Code provision did not
apply to a Saturday half holiday:
. 788. The time within which an act, in an action or special
proceeding, brought, as specified in the last section, is required by law to be
done, must be computed, by excluding the first, and including the last
day; except where it is otherwise specially prescribed by law. If the last
day is Sunday, or a legal holiday, it must be excluded. Where the act is
required to be done within two days, and an intervening day is Sunday,
or a legal holiday, it must also be excluded. Act of June 2, 1876; Laws,
ch. 448.
This section was amended for some reason, by Act of June 5, 1877,
Laws, ch. 416, i, changing "legal holiday " to "public holiday."
The other case decided that "The recent Half Holiday Act does not
prevent the service of papers or the execution cf writs in legal proceedings on that day or any part of it" : MCADAM, Ch. J., Nichols v. Kelsey
(1887), also reported in 2o Abb. New Cases i5.
Reynolds v. Palen (1887), 2o Abb. New Cases Ii, in the Supreme Court,
was a case which involved the time for serving a complaint. The last
day fell upon Saturday, and the Court, without sufficient foundation, declared, first, that the plaintiff had the whole of Saturday to make service;
and, second, that he was not required to act in the holidaypart of the day,
so that he might wait until Monday. No reason for thesecond resolution
was given.
OHIO.

(See 29 AmERICAN LAw REGISTER 177.)

"AN ACT to create an additional legal holiday." Passed April 24, 1890;
Laws, page 280.
"ScITioN r. Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly of lhe Stateof Ohio,
That the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in each year,
from and between the hours of twelve o'clock noon and two P. I., shall
be, for election purposes only, a legal part holiday. And no employee
who is an elector shall be compelled or required to perform any labor
between said hours, nor shall any employer or his or its officers or agents
discharge any such employee because he fails or refuses to labor between
said hours or require or order any such employee to accompany him to
the voting place of such employee, and any person violating any of the
provisions of this act shall upon conviction be fined notmorethan twentyfive dollars."
Labor Day has been added by the following Statute:
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"AN ACT to provide for the observance of the first Monday in September
of each year and every year as a holiday."
Passed April 28, 1890
Laws, page 355.
" SEcTIOt
I. Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly of theState of Ohio,
That the first Monday in September of each and every year, shall be
known as labor day ; and be for all purposes whatever, except for the presentment for payment or acceptance, and the protesting or the giving of
uotice of non-acceptance or of non-payment of all negotiable instruments,
.onsidered as the first day of the week."
PENNSYLVANIA. (See 29 AmERIC.N LAW REGISTER 178.)
There is still no final decision of the Supreme Court of this State upon
the character of a legal holiday. The decision of Judge WOODWARD (cited
in 29 AMERICAzN LAW REGISTER I5o) has been. followed by Judge
SWARTZ, of Montgomery County, in Worthington v. Hobensack (1889), 8
Pa. C. C. Rep. 65, in refusing to strike off an appeal from the judgment
of a justice of the peace, the objection being that the appeal had been entered in court upon Labor Day. The entering of the appeal was a ministerial act, which the public officers need not perform, but was valid if voluntarily performed.
Upon the trial of an issue devisavit vel non, in the Common Pleas of
Delaware County, the Court sat during Good Friday, though the verdict
was not rendered until the next day. The Court held this session no
ground for a new trial, as "The matter is discretionary with the Court" :
CLAVTON, P. J., Hannum v. Worrall (1883), 2 Del. Co. Rep. 49, 5o; thus
agreeing with the decisions cited in 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 145.
Another County Court decision will be noticed more at length in a
subsequent number of this magazine.
VIRGINIA. (See 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 182.)
Section 2844 of the Code was amended by chapter I5O of the laws of
189o (approved February 28, I89O) by inserting the words "the nineteenth
day of January (known as Lee's birthday)," among the days mentioned
as legal holidays.
U. S. v. Brewer et al.was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, March 23, 189T, on a certificate of division of opinion between the
Circuit and District Judges in the 'Western District of Tennessee, upon
demu.rers to several counts of an indictment for removing a ballot box
from the polling place to a private house before counting the votes deposited therein, at an election for a representative in Congress, held
November 6, 1888, in the Third Ward of the City of Memphis. The offense was charged under 5515 Rev. Stat. U. S. (See 29 AMNERICAN LAW
REGISTER 357 et seqq.), as being an implied violation of the Tennessee
Code, e Io67, io68, 1070, "no fraud being averred in the indictment, and
no intent to affect the election or its result, and there being no allegation
that the election, or its result, was affected " : BLATCHFORD, J. Hence
the answers were returned to the Circuit Court, that there was no such
duty upon the election officers as required them to make the count and
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announce its result before removing the ballot box from the polling place;
'
for I Laws which create crime, ought to be so explicit that all men sub.
ject to their penalties, may know what acts it is their duty to avoid: U.
S. v. Sharp (185), Pet. C. C. iIS. Before a man can be punished, his
case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute: U. S. v.
Lacher (i89o), 134 U. S. 624, 628."
This Lacher Case came into the Supreme Court ona division of opinion
between the Circuit Judges for the Southern District of New York in a
criminal charge against a post office employee, for embezzling a letter
with a valuable enclosure. The opinion was by Chief Justice FULLER,
and the sentence quoted was immediately followed by this : " But, though
penal laws are to be construed strictly, yet the intention of the legislature
must govern in the construction of penal as well as the other statutes, and
they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention-of the legislature." The following authorities are then cited: U. S. v.
Willberger (1820), 5 Wheat. (i U. S.) 76, where Chief Justice MARSHALL
declared that manslughter committed by an American seaman in a river
within the Empire of China, could not be punished with fine and impriso
onment, under r2, Act of April 3 , 1790, ch. 36, denouncing such an act
when committed "on the high seas." The prosecution urged that this
8, which
description of the place was to be interpreted by
described places where a crime punishable by the United States
with the penalty of death might be committed. This contention
was denied, upon an examination of the whole act, because the
rule of strict construction of a penal law, "amounts to this, that
though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature."
U. S. v. Aforris (1840), 14 Peters (39 U. S.) 464, where Chief Justice
TANRY answered the same Circuit Court, that an actual transportation of
slaves was not necessary, if a voyage had been undertaken with that
intent. The Act of May io, z8oo, H 2 and 3, denounced voluntary service on a vessel employed in carrying slaves, and yet it was applied where
the vessel was merely on the way to load with slaves. American Fur
Co. v. U. S. (1829), 2 Peters (27 U. S.) 385, where Justice WASHING'TON
reversed the District Court for Ohio, because the jury had been instructed,
in effect, that the Indian country, within which ardent spirits could not
be sold, included territory purchased by the Government from the Indians. But otherwise the principles of the Wiltbergev Case were followed.
U.S. v. Winn (1838), 3 Sumner 209, 211, per STORY, J., "that the proper
course, in all these cases, is to search out and followthe true intent of the
legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words which harmonizes best
with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy
and objects of the legislature," is another and importantcitation. Hence
the chief officer was held to be one of the crew of a ship, for whose imprisonnient by the master there was a penalty provided by Act of March
3, 1835, ch. 40, 5, punishing the master, if from malice, etc., he "imprison any one or more of the crew." Chief Justice FULLER closed his
citations by quoting from Sedgwick (Stat. and Const. Law, 2d. ed. 282) a
statement based upon The King v. Inhab. Hodnelt (1786), 1 T. R. 96, ioI,
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where a marriage law, requiring the consent of the father, guardian or
mother of a person under age, was applied to an illegimate and a marriage
avoided for want of such consent, the mother being alive at the time of
the marriage ceremony.
The Tennessee election case, therefore, appears to have turned on the
intent and effect of the removal of the ballot box, and not simply upon
the mere silence of the Tennessee law (See 29 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
356, 357.
DRESSED MEAT cases still arise, notwithstanding the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the BarberCase (see 29 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER 807, sqq.), and one of these came into the Supreme
Court by an appeal of the State officer, who had arrested a violator of the
State law, but lost his prisoner on a habeas corpus proceeding before the
United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia: In re
Rebman (189O), 41 Fed. Repr. 867, and Brimmer v. Rebman, decided by
the Supreme Court, January I9, I89r. The petitioner, William Rebman,
was tried and convicted before a justice of the peace in the City of Norfolk, for having sold Chicago dressed beef without inspection, as required
by the law of Virginia:
CHAP. 8o.-An Act to prevent the selling of unwholesome meat.
(Ap
proved, February 18, I89o; Laws, page 63.)
WHEREAS, it is believed that unwholesome meats are being offered for
sale in this Commonwealth; therefore,
i. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That it shall not
be lawful to offer for sale, within the limits of this State, any fresh meats
(beef, veal or mutton) which shall have been slaughtered one hundred
miles, or over, from the place at which it is offered for sale, until and
except it has been inspected and approved as hereinafter provided.
2. The county court of each county, and the corporation court of each
city of this State, shall, in their respective counties and cities, appoint
one or more inspectors of fresh meats, on the petition of not less than
twenty citizens, and it shall be the duty of said inspectors to inspect and
approve, or condemn, all fresh meats offered for sale in this State, which
has been transported one hundred miles, or more, from the place at which
it was slaughtered.
3. And for all fresh meats so inspected, said inspector shall receive, as
his compensation, one cent per pound, to be paid by the owner of the
meat.
/
4. It shall be the duty of any and all persons, firms, or corporations,
before offering for sale in this State, fresh meats, which under the provisions of this Act are required to be inspected, to apply to the fresh meat
inspector of the county or city where the same is proposed to be sold,
and have said meat inspected; and for a failure so to do, or for offering to
sell any fresh meats, condemned by said inspector, the person, firm, or
corporation so selling, or offering to sell, shall be fined not less th'n fifty,
nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense, to be recovered
before any justice of the peace of the county or city where the violation
occurs; Provided, that in cities of fifteen thousand inhabitants or more,
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one-half the fees of the inspectors shall be paid into the State treasury,
and provided,further, that nothing in this Act shall apply to the counties
of Accomac and Northampton.
5. The said inspectors, before discharging the duties herein imposed,
shall take and subscribe an oath before the court appointing them, to
faithfully discharge said duties, and the several courts are respectively
empowered to remove, for cause, any inspector, and to appoint another,
or others, instead.
6. This Act shall be in force from and after the first day of March,
eighteen hundred and ninety.
The similarity to the Minnesota Act of 1889 (See 29 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER 807) is noticeable, and the result was the same, Justice HARLAN
delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, that "the statute is, in
effect, a prohibition upon the sale in Virginia, of beef, veal or mutton, although entirely wholesome, if from animals slaughtered one hundred
miles, or over, from the place of sale." And this, because a State "may
not, under the guise of exerting its police powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make discriminations against the products and industries of
its own, or of other States," by taxing dressed meat at one cent a pound.
And following the principles of lVellon v. .17issouri(See 29 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER 751), the Court declared that "Any local regulation
which, in terms, or by its necessary operation, denies this equality in the
markets of a State, is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other States, a direct burden upon commerce among the States,
and therefore void." To rebuke a forgetfulness that the local liberty, so
dear to those who advocate these petty laws, depends upon the power of
the whole country for its very existence, the Court also cited from IValling v. Milichigan (See 29 AmERICAx LAW REGISTER 738), that this inspection fee was in reality "a discriminatingtax imposed bva State [and],
operating to the disadvantage of the products of other States when introduced into the first mentioned State;" thisbeing, "in effect, a regulation
in restraint of commerce anong the States * * * is a usurpation of
the powers conferred upon the Congress of the United States." Further,
to preventstill more insignificant isolation of parts of a State, the Court
cited from the Robins Case (See 29 AMiERICAN LAW REGISTER
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8), that

the application of the statute to people in the enacting State will not
validate it: it is the effect upon commerce and not upon persons, that is
condemned.
The appellation of inspection laws to such statutes as these Dressed
Meat laws, is a misnomer. An inspection law must indeed relate to the
quality of such articles (See 29 AmERICAN LAW PEGISTER 833), and a
reasonable charge can be made for the service, but all these Dressed Meat
laws are directed against the Chicago beef trade and are plainly founded
napon the untenable idea that meat slaughtered at the point of consumption
is necessarily good meat until sold or consumed, while meat transported
for a distance between slaughtering and sale is so likely to be dangerous
as to require police regulation. If all dressed meat was put under the ban,
there would be more justice, and more certainty of the law being declared
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